The Ballot or the Bullet: Islamists and Democracy

[jinnzaman]

D. In those states that have no Islamist parties, but have attempted to uphold Islamic law, their have been foreign influence as well (Afghanistan and the Apostasy debacle)

The fourth empirical problem with arguing that the Shari’ah should be subjected to vote is that in those elections where Islamists have won, they were either kicked out or marginalized by foreign powers. The best illustration of this pattern is in Palestine’s first major elections following the demise of Yasser Arafat. In the January 2006 elections, HAMAS won a large majority of the seats in the Palestinian parliament. Out of the 132 available seats, it won 76 seats whereas the next largest party, Fatah, received only 43 seats. The US and Israel responded by freezing tens of millions of dollars in aid and didn’t unfreeze it until a civil conflict erupted between Fatah and HAMAS. The US then began sending over $150 million in direct cash transfers to the Palestinian authority in order to bolster Mahmoud Abbas while Israel went so far as to release $800 million in Palestinian tax revenues that they had withheld when HAMAS had won the elections. The US also began sending $40 million of emergency aid to various humanitarian organizations in Gaza in order to undermine HAMAS further. The strategy worked and HAMAS, the democratically elected political party of the Palestinian people, has been caged off in Gaza. This illustrates that even if Islamist parties were to actually win seats, foreign interference in the form of economic sanctions, boycotts, or counter-funding strategies will be used to subvert the popular will of the Muslim people who seek the Islamization of their society.

E. In those states that have popular Islamist movements, they have been subjected to foreign influence as well (Afghanistan under the Taliban, Somalia, now Sudan)

Fifthly, in those states where Islamists have actually acquired dominance, they have been subject to foreign influence as well, such as how the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the UIC in Somalia have been overthrown. Somalia is a more pertinent example given the weakness of the alleged links to terrorism. The UIC brought organized government to a country that had been racked by anarchy and civil strife for over a decade. They re-opened Mogadishu Airport and Seaport after being close for almost a decade, and fought fought pirates that were preventing food aid from coming into the country, opposed the destruction of the environment, and banned the use of narcotic substances. Nonetheless, the US through the CIA funneled thousands of dollars over a period of several months in order to support warlords who opposed the Islamization of the country. This illustrates that even where Islamists attain power in a just manner and unify countries torn by civil wars and anarchy, foreign powers will nonetheless interfere to stop the Islamization of the country.

F. In those states that Islamists have won, they have achieved remarkable progress, especially financially (Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia)

The final criticism that democrats have of Islamists is that, even if they were to win these elections, they would not have a viable program for economic growth for their constituencies. This argument has many flaws with it. The first problem with this argument is that the purpose of Islam as a whole is not the acquisition of material goods, but worshipping Allah (subhana wa ta’ala) as he deserves to be worshipped. While work is promoted under the Islamic worldview, the accumulation of wealth is looked down upon to the extent that Islamic law establishes many practices that redistribute wealth. In addition to this problem, the empirical evidence indicates that Islamists have faired well in the economic sector. In fact, one of the reasons for the popularity of Islamist groups such as Ikhwan, Hizbullah, and Jamat e Islami is their ability to generate funds which are distributed for humanitarian organizations. Ikhwan al Muslimeen has established 4,000 NGOs in Egypt alone and has dominated Egypt’s professional unions. The overwhelming majority of Islamist groups are comprised of working professionals and entrepreneurs such as doctors, engineers, lawyers, etc. (p 33-34, “Making Islam Democratic” by Asef Bayat)
Turkey’s Justice and Development party grew out of the Islamist welfare party which was forcibly dismantled by a coup d’etat in 1997. In the 2004 election, the AKP won 42% of the popular vote, beating out the secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Social Democratic People’s Party. In 2005, the GDP growth rate for the country was 7.4%, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world thanks to the fair market values espoused by the AKP. (Source)

IV. Conclusion

The general trends seem to indicate that the masses want some degree of Islamization and political empowerment and Islamists have been able to fulfill these demands in the few political arenas that they are allowed to enter. However, due to corrupt elites colluding with foreign powers, these political successes are reduced. If the course that the Ummah seeks to embark on is a path of democratization, then we must become aware of those situations where democratization is not really about popular empowerment but about minimal political participation that conforms to the global capitalist system. Those who seek to promote democracy must realize the severe limitations that such a path would take and must realize that in some situations, they are working against the sovereignty of there people instead of supporting it.
If democratization is a waste of time, some might argue to scrap the program entirely. Instead of the ballot, why don’t Islamists simply adopt the bullet? The problem with violent revolution is that the Shari’ah, according to Sunni orthodoxy, is severely limited. In those situations where Islamists have engaged in popular revolt (Algeria, Syria, Pakistan), they have failed to whip up popular support and their actions have denigrated into either a quick bloodbath or a cycle of violence that creates disillusionment from even their constituents. It is in the best interests of the Ummah, then, that Islamists submit themselves to the rule of law, whether Islamic or Western. If legal means exist to amend social injustices, then Islamists should utilize those means. If there are no legal means, they should engage in a thorough political campaign of agitation using non-violent means. The only circumstance where the Shari’ah permits violence is when rulers have clearly and unequivocally apostated. This apostasy must be open enough that it begins to affect the very nature of the state. Such judgments are reserved for experts in the religious sciences, the fuqaha and independent judges. The overwhelming majority of them have declined to engage in takfeer of rulers.

Unfortunately, this leaves little room for addressing social injustices. Nonetheless, Islamists must utilize whatever Islamically lawful means they can to promote their agenda. Violent revolution is counterproductive and undermines the legitimacy of the Islamist vision. If the end is to promote Shari’ah, the means must be in conformity with the Shari’ah as well. Islamists should not engage in compromises of their values for short term political success. Moreover, it would contravene the Sunnah of the Prophet (sallahu alayhi wa sallam) to impose the Shari’ah from the state in a top-down manner. Islamists should focus on building Muslim characters, promoting family values, engaging in promoting the good and forbidding the evil, reviving the Sacred Sciences, promoting Halal commercial ventures, and applying pressure on elites and political actors to Islamize by arguing with them in the best of manners. While the ballot may not provide immediate realization of the Islamist dream, the bullet will produce only nightmares.

[jinnzaman]

III. Empirical Issues

A. Islamic governance has been the historical norm and democratization seems more to be a by-product of the imbalance of power between Muslim states and the West

The first empirical problem with the argument that the Shari’ah should be subjected to the vote is that, as a matter of history, Islamic governance has been the universal norm within Muslim societies whereas democratization seems to be more of a by-product of the imbalance of power between Muslim states and the West. Even the most extreme of the Islamic sect known as the Khwaraj supported the Shari’ah in spit eof rejecting the notion of organized government. These anarchists held that the proscriptions of Islamic law could be fulfilled in a manner that is similar to how the obligation of prayer is fulfilled, namely, by a congregation assembling and appointing a leader for the specific task. Neither Shi’a nor Sunni jurists or states questioned the authority of the Shari’ah. (p 57-58; “God’s Rule” by Patricia Crone) Thus, for a good millennium, the interplay between the Shari’ah and the state was never questioned by any major group of scholars or political actors. The burden of proof on governance and law, then, is upon those who have deviated from the historical norm. Democrats must show why democracy should be the legitimate government, not why the Shari’ah should be implemented.

B. Polls reveal that Muslims do want Islamic governance

The second empirical problem with the democratic argument is that the popular will can be expressed through alternative means besides voting, such as by polling. While much research is needed, present day polls from a variety of Muslim countries illustrate that Muslims the world over do want Shari’ah. In April 2007, the University of Maryland conducted a poll entitled “Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al-Qaeda” across four majority Muslim countries: Egypt, Pakistan, Morocco, and Indonesia). The poll revealed that largee majorities averaging 71% supported the “strict application of Shari’a law in every Islamic country.” (Pakistan = 79% supporte d Shari’ah, Moroccans = 76%, Egyptians = 74%, Indonesians = 53%). If strong majorities in the four most popular Muslim countries supported Shari’ah through polls, this illustrates that the votes confirming the implementation of the Shari’ah may not be that difficult to accomplish. This is further supported by the next segment.

C. In those states with elections, Islamists have won and were kicked out or their power minimalized by local or foreign interference (Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Palestine, Iran, Lebanon)

The third empirical problem with the notion that the Shari’ah should be submitted to vote is that Islamists have already won in many popular elections. Their victory can be seen as an implicit affirmation of the Shari’ah since it is often a component of their campaign platforms. In states with high voter turnout and low government interference, Islamist victories have been quite high. The best case example of this general trend can be illustrated in Algerian elections. After achieving independence, Algeria was subjected to military rule for the next few decades. Elections were announced to occur in the late 1990s and various political parties formed, the most pertinent of which is the FIS whose goals included establishing an Islamic state ruled by Shari’ah, promoting free market capitalism with Islamic (interest-free) banking, promoting gender segregation by creating financial incentives for women to stay at home. (The party was split over the issue of democracy itself as a means or an end). In 1990, local elections were the first multiparty elections to take place in independent Algeria. Voter turnout was extremely high at 65.2% and the percentage of votes cast was 62.2%. The FIS won over 54% of the vote. The nationalist FLN got only 23.4%. The remaining Islamist parties also received moderate gains: Hamas got 5.3% of the vote, Ennahda got 2.2%, the Movement for Democracy in Algeria got 2.0%. Thus, not only did a strong Islamist party get the highest vote, but it beat out both democratic and moderate Islamist parties by a landfall. Of 430 seats contested, 231 were won outright with 50% or more of the ballot; the remaining 199 would have proceeded to a second ballot contested only by the two candidates with the highest number of votes. Given that the FIS got double the vote over FLN, Algeria would have very quickly become an Islamic state had the elections not been cancelled by a military coup after concerns that FIS was going to win and attain the 2/3 majority to amend Constitution. After the election, the government also redrew electoral districts to favor secularist political parties. When elections were reconvened in 1991, the FIS still won a majority of the popular vote (48%) in the first round of Parliamentary elections. The government responded by canceling the electoral process in early January of 1992. In spite of being banned, the FIS attempted to engage political processes before finally calling for armed resistance in 1993 when many people had already been engaging in guerilla fighting led by non-FIS groups. The resulting civil war resulted in the deaths of over thousands of civilians caught in the cross fire between the government and guerilla fighters. After the civil war ended, the first major election occurred in 2007 where voter turnout was 35%, the lowest in Algeria’s history and many organizations boycotted the elections because they felt that the elections were consistently rigged. In spite of these limitations, Islamist parties made moderate gains. (Sources: Human Rights Watch, Wikipedia) This shows that where voter turnout is high and government interference is minimal, Muslim countries that have Islamist parties may very well be on their way to an Islamic state.

Even in states with low voter turnout and high government interference, Islamists have still performed quite well. For example, in Egyptian elections, Ikhwan al Muslimeen was able to acquire 20% of the seats of Parliament in spite of (a) lower voter turnout, (b) voting irregularities such as (i) the nationalist party transporting voters to the polls by bus, (ii) polling stations being plastered with pro-Mubarak posters and NDP members taking ballots from voters and handing them to polling stations, (c) elections being boycotted by parties who felt that they weren’t free of fair, and (d) the Ikhwan being banned. Had such heavy-handed tactics by the government not taken place and if Ikhwan was eligible to be a legitimate political party, with its over 1 million members, it would undoubtedly dominate any subsequent elections.

[jinnzaman]

II. Theoretical Issues

A. Subjecting the rule of God to human judgment is kufr, contradicting the basic tenets of Islamic aqeedah

The first theoretical issue with arguing that Islamic law should be subject to democratic vote is that it is a fundamental deviation from mainstream orthodox theology.. The totality of Islamic law can be reduced into actions that are deemed obligatory, recommended, neutral, detested, and prohibited. Many of the contentious legal issues pertaining to Islamic governance revolve around certain proscriptions that are deemed to be obligatory. Denying an obligation is considered a matter of theology because, under some circumstances, it would constitute kufr (disbelief). A perfect case example of the declaration of belief in the Qur’an is in the story of the fall of Iblis. The act that lead to the proclamation of kufr of Iblis was not his actual non-belief of Allah . “And when We said to the angels: “Prostrate before Adam” So, they prostrated, all but Iblis. He refused, and joined the infidels.” (2:34) Iblis believed in Allah (subhana wa ta’ala) as is evident in the fact that he directly addressed Allah in his speech. The source of kufr for Iblis was his denial of the explicit command of Allah (subhana wa ta’ala) to fulfill a particular obligation. This principle of denying obligations may constitute kufr if the obligation is established from conclusive, unambiguous sources such as the Qur’an or mutawattir hadeeth. Thus, subjecting specific aspects of the Shari’ah that apply to governance may result in communal acts of disbelief. If Muslims were to subject prohibitions such as the hudood to popular vote and the result was a denial of these obligations, then the society as a whole would either have committed disbelief or engaged in a major sin. Thus, for Islamists whose primary focus is the preservation of an Islamic polity that is rooted in a particular understanding of theology, it would be contradictory for them to participate in electoral politics on matters pertaining to the Shari’ah.


B. It would be contradictory for Islamists to do so because some of them (extreme Salafists, Hizb e Tehrir, Tanzeem e Islam, al-Muhajiroun) don’t deem democracy to be a valid political or legal system

The second reason, which emanates from the principles established above, that Islamists should not have to vote on the Shari’ah is because many of them do not deem democracy to be a valid form of government. Organizations such as Hizb e Tehrir, Tanzeem e Islam, al-Muhajiroun, and even some extreme Salafist organizations deem democracy as being either haram (impermissible) or kufr (disbelief) for intervening in matters of legislation that they deem belong solely to Allah (subhana wa ta’laa). which they do not deem to be in the realm of legislation for human beings, but for Allah (subhana wa ta’ala). "The attitude of true believers, when they are called toward Allah and His Messenger to judge between them, is to say: we hear and we obey; and such are successful." (24:51) For Islamists, this attitude of non-cooperation with deviant political systems is exemplified in the living embodiment of the Shari’ah, the Prophet Muhammad (sallahu alayhi wa sallam). From the Islamist perspective, while the Prophet was offered many political and economic accommodations ranging from power-sharing arrangements to offers of kingship, he rejected all of them as they had conditioned specific theological clauses such as the worshipping of other idols or alternating worship or at least sharing the authority of legislation. The social contract that existed in Madinah was predicated on many conditions, such as that Muslims would be ruled by the Shari’ah and none of the components of the Shari’ah were agreed upon by discussion, but by divine revelation. Since subjecting the Shari’ah to the vote would contradict the most basic fundamentals of the faith, Islamists would not advocate engaging in electoral politics on these matters.

C. It would also be contradictory for democrats to do so because if Islamists were to win in the elections, it would be contradictory for Islamists to win in elections and than abrogate the secularized nature of the state and certain rights

The third issue with the argument that the Shari’ah should be subjected to a popular vote through democratic processes is that it would undermine democracy itself. From the perspective of democrats, the authority of state power emanates from the people and all subsequent political actors, institutions, and laws must either arise from their consent or the consent of those who are given representative authority. However, if Islamists were to win in elections (in the foregoing paragraphs I will show that this is a very serious possibility in many Muslim countries) and they were to implement the Shari’ah, then democrats would be caught in a catch 22: either they would be forced to concede that the popular will desires the Shari’ah and democracy will have to be scrapped or they will have to engage in extralegal measures to subvert Islamists from taking power. Either proposal undermines democracy and illustrates that the challenge to submitting the Shari’ah to popular vote is being made in bad faith and is merely a rhetorical device for preserving the power of elites who have no desire to relinquish their power within Muslim countries.

D. Defining the relevant electorate

The fourth theoretical problem with subjecting the Shari’ah to popular vote is the issue of defining the relevant electorate. In deciding whether to accept the Shari’ah, should all adult Muslims be allowed to vote? What about non-Muslims or members of groups that have been deemed heretical and outside of the fold of Islam by orthodoxy? Why should non-Muslim minorities decision to vote on the Shari’ah carry any weight since they do not even deem the religion of Islam to be valid? Moreover, should people who have no knowledge of the Shari’ah except for what they’ve been told by hostile Western academia and reinforced by corporate media that is subservient to the national security states that are arising in the West be allowed to vote on this matter or should their first be a rigorous public debate and education of both Islamic and Western political and legal systems? Who would be in charge of these discussions? If no knowledge of Islamic law is required, then will children be allowed to participate in a vote since they can make a similar judgment? Should the vote be a “all or nothing” approach or should specific provisions of Islamic law be subject to vote? Should the vote be irrevocable or should be it be revocable? If it is revocable and based on specific provisions, then this will initiate the contradictory theological dilemma for Islamists described above as well as the human rights dilemma for democrats. If non-Muslims were allowed to vote, but the resulting vote was a victory for the reduction of rights for religious minorities, this would result in an ideological defeat for both Islamists and democrats. This would not end the present day schizophrenia within Muslim lands and might result in further sectarian tensions that may result in civil war.

E. Defining the relevant electoral districts

The fifth theoretical problem with subjecting the Shari’ah to popular vote is the issue of defining the relevant electoral districts. Since Islamists reject the nation-state system as being the by-product of colonialism, they would not recognize any votes in particular polities since they would not represent the true Islamic polity, the Caliphate. If electoral districts were defined within the present day nation-state construct, the votes would occur in political systems that are already biased towards Western ideologies since they were created, fostered, and sustained for that primary purpose. Thus, the only way to prevent gerrymandering and an imbalance of voting power resulting from electoral districts with varying populations, sectarian, and educated elements would be to ignore the nation-state system and instead create a new system of electoral districts that equalized the voting power of all Muslims that accurately represented the ethnic, sectarian, and ideological divisions with their societies. This problem alone would render such a vote next to impossible it is highly doubtful that any functional designation of electoral districts would be agreed upon by either Islamists or democrats.

This is a summary of the major theoretical issues with arguing that the Shari’ah should be subjected to democratic vote.

[jinnzaman]

Global Intifada

“It’ll be -- It’ll be the -- the ballot or it’ll be the bullet. It’ll be liberty or it’ll be death. And if you’re not ready to pay that price don’t use the word freedom in your vocabulary.”
- Malcolm X -

I. Introduction

The Muslim world seems to be locked in battle between various factions competing for dominance in their respective societies. Presently, the two leading forces seem to be the proponents of Islamism against those who are proponents of secular liberal democratic capitalism. While not all of the various groups can be properly categorized neatly into these two categories, generally speaking, Islamists are those who seek the destruction of the nation-state system by replacing it with a Universal Caliphate that seeks to implement the Shari’ah. Within the Islamist school there are two groups: traditionalists and fundamentalists. The Traditionalist paradigm for political revival is Gramscian in the sense that it recognizes that the state is not the ultimate objective of revolution, but rather, merely a means to a complete and total social transformation. For Traditionalist Islamists, the focus if or an intellectual elite, the ‘Ulema, to woo other segments of society so that the formal acquisition of power by the state does not create a conflict between those who lack the intellectual foundations to appreciate the Islamization of society. Fundamentalists seem to take a more Stalinist approach where the state is the be-all-end-all of Islamic civilization. For them, intellectual elites are not intrinsically necessary for a Islamic Revolution and ultimately detracts from the expediency of acquisition of power. Secular liberal democratic capitalism is rather self-explanatory. These two groups and their sub-groups are confronting one another in various segments of Muslim societies from families, to public forums, to the political arena. The focus is of this paper is on one particular area of conflict between these two groups: the mode of governance. The democrats have often argued that the only valid form of government is democracy since it takes its consent directly from the people. They argue that Shari’ah is an abomination in the modern world and if Islamists seek to implement the Shari’ah, then they should subject themselves to democratic processes and win elections. There are two categorizations of problems this argument. The first can be categorized as theoretical and the second can be categorized as empirical/historical.

Theoretical problems with this argument: (A) subjecting the rule of God to human judgment is kufr, contradicting the basic tenets of Islamic aqeedah, (B) it would be contradictory for Islamists to do so because some of them (extreme Salafists, Hizb e Tehrir, Tanzeem e Islam, al-Muhajiroun) don’t deem democracy to be a valid political or legal system, (C) it would also be contradictory for democrats to do so because if Islamists were to win in the elections, it would be contradictory for Islamists to win in elections and than abrogate the secularized nature of the state and certain rights, (D) defining the relevant electorate, (E) defining the relevant electoral districts.

Empirical problems with this argument: (A) Islamic governance has been the historical norm and democratization seems more to be a by-product of the imbalance of power between Muslim states and the West, (B) polls reveal that Muslims do want Islamic governance, (C) in those states with elections, Islamists have won and were kicked out or their power minimalized by local or foreign interference (Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Palestine, Iran, Lebanon), (D) in those states that have no Islamist parties, but have attempted to uphold Islamic law, their have been foreign influence as well (Afghanistan and the Apostasy debacle), (E) in those states that have popular Islamist movements, they have been subjected to foreign influence as well (Afghanistan under the Taliban, Somalia, now Sudan), (F) in those states that Islamists have won, they have achieved remarkable progress, especially financially (Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia).

[MossadConspiracy]

or the bottle

[GOTFIVEONIT]

Turkey's 'Islamist' party doesnt even call themselves that, they call themsevles a 'conservative' party on par with western conservative parties. I find them to be the a shining example however for other islamic political parties throughout the Ummah. In other words, they are hardly the Taliban. But it is true, in cases where they have been held back from the political process, violence has broken out. Let them take part in elections, let them take thier message to the voting masses. if it's what the people want, then let them vote them in. I dont like the fact that jamaat i islami is ruling NWFP province in pakistan, but i know given thier policies that they have instituted, that they will be thrown out of office once election time rolls around. It is a proven fact that when these parties are allowed to take part in the political process, politcial violence is almost non-existence.

[jinnzaman]

GOTFIVEONIT said

Turkey's 'Islamist' party doesnt even call themselves that, they call themsevles a 'conservative' party on par with western conservative parties. I find them to be the a shining example however for other islamic political parties throughout the Ummah. In other words, they are hardly the Taliban. But it is true, in cases where they have been held back from the political process, violence has broken out. Let them take part in elections, let them take thier message to the voting masses. if it's what the people want, then let them vote them in. I dont like the fact that jamaat i islami is ruling NWFP province in pakistan, but i know given thier policies that they have instituted, that they will be thrown out of office once election time rolls around. It is a proven fact that when these parties are allowed to take part in the political process, politcial violence is almost non-existence.

The core leadership of the AKP came out of a previous party that was forcibly dismantled because it was Islamist. It'd be somewhat surprising that they just abandoned their Islamist scheme at the turn of a hat. Its more likely that they've chosen a strategy such as Ikhwan, HAMAS, and Hizbullah are taking, which is to work within the system and change it from the inside.

Either way, they certainly aren't secular. There's been a handful of controversies here and there and the Turkish military has always let it be known that it will step in if it feels like things are getting too Islamic.