[jinnzaman]

III. Empirical Issues

A. Islamic governance has been the historical norm and democratization seems more to be a by-product of the imbalance of power between Muslim states and the West

The first empirical problem with the argument that the Shari’ah should be subjected to the vote is that, as a matter of history, Islamic governance has been the universal norm within Muslim societies whereas democratization seems to be more of a by-product of the imbalance of power between Muslim states and the West. Even the most extreme of the Islamic sect known as the Khwaraj supported the Shari’ah in spit eof rejecting the notion of organized government. These anarchists held that the proscriptions of Islamic law could be fulfilled in a manner that is similar to how the obligation of prayer is fulfilled, namely, by a congregation assembling and appointing a leader for the specific task. Neither Shi’a nor Sunni jurists or states questioned the authority of the Shari’ah. (p 57-58; “God’s Rule” by Patricia Crone) Thus, for a good millennium, the interplay between the Shari’ah and the state was never questioned by any major group of scholars or political actors. The burden of proof on governance and law, then, is upon those who have deviated from the historical norm. Democrats must show why democracy should be the legitimate government, not why the Shari’ah should be implemented.

B. Polls reveal that Muslims do want Islamic governance

The second empirical problem with the democratic argument is that the popular will can be expressed through alternative means besides voting, such as by polling. While much research is needed, present day polls from a variety of Muslim countries illustrate that Muslims the world over do want Shari’ah. In April 2007, the University of Maryland conducted a poll entitled “Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al-Qaeda” across four majority Muslim countries: Egypt, Pakistan, Morocco, and Indonesia). The poll revealed that largee majorities averaging 71% supported the “strict application of Shari’a law in every Islamic country.” (Pakistan = 79% supporte d Shari’ah, Moroccans = 76%, Egyptians = 74%, Indonesians = 53%). If strong majorities in the four most popular Muslim countries supported Shari’ah through polls, this illustrates that the votes confirming the implementation of the Shari’ah may not be that difficult to accomplish. This is further supported by the next segment.

C. In those states with elections, Islamists have won and were kicked out or their power minimalized by local or foreign interference (Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Palestine, Iran, Lebanon)

The third empirical problem with the notion that the Shari’ah should be submitted to vote is that Islamists have already won in many popular elections. Their victory can be seen as an implicit affirmation of the Shari’ah since it is often a component of their campaign platforms. In states with high voter turnout and low government interference, Islamist victories have been quite high. The best case example of this general trend can be illustrated in Algerian elections. After achieving independence, Algeria was subjected to military rule for the next few decades. Elections were announced to occur in the late 1990s and various political parties formed, the most pertinent of which is the FIS whose goals included establishing an Islamic state ruled by Shari’ah, promoting free market capitalism with Islamic (interest-free) banking, promoting gender segregation by creating financial incentives for women to stay at home. (The party was split over the issue of democracy itself as a means or an end). In 1990, local elections were the first multiparty elections to take place in independent Algeria. Voter turnout was extremely high at 65.2% and the percentage of votes cast was 62.2%. The FIS won over 54% of the vote. The nationalist FLN got only 23.4%. The remaining Islamist parties also received moderate gains: Hamas got 5.3% of the vote, Ennahda got 2.2%, the Movement for Democracy in Algeria got 2.0%. Thus, not only did a strong Islamist party get the highest vote, but it beat out both democratic and moderate Islamist parties by a landfall. Of 430 seats contested, 231 were won outright with 50% or more of the ballot; the remaining 199 would have proceeded to a second ballot contested only by the two candidates with the highest number of votes. Given that the FIS got double the vote over FLN, Algeria would have very quickly become an Islamic state had the elections not been cancelled by a military coup after concerns that FIS was going to win and attain the 2/3 majority to amend Constitution. After the election, the government also redrew electoral districts to favor secularist political parties. When elections were reconvened in 1991, the FIS still won a majority of the popular vote (48%) in the first round of Parliamentary elections. The government responded by canceling the electoral process in early January of 1992. In spite of being banned, the FIS attempted to engage political processes before finally calling for armed resistance in 1993 when many people had already been engaging in guerilla fighting led by non-FIS groups. The resulting civil war resulted in the deaths of over thousands of civilians caught in the cross fire between the government and guerilla fighters. After the civil war ended, the first major election occurred in 2007 where voter turnout was 35%, the lowest in Algeria’s history and many organizations boycotted the elections because they felt that the elections were consistently rigged. In spite of these limitations, Islamist parties made moderate gains. (Sources: Human Rights Watch, Wikipedia) This shows that where voter turnout is high and government interference is minimal, Muslim countries that have Islamist parties may very well be on their way to an Islamic state.

Even in states with low voter turnout and high government interference, Islamists have still performed quite well. For example, in Egyptian elections, Ikhwan al Muslimeen was able to acquire 20% of the seats of Parliament in spite of (a) lower voter turnout, (b) voting irregularities such as (i) the nationalist party transporting voters to the polls by bus, (ii) polling stations being plastered with pro-Mubarak posters and NDP members taking ballots from voters and handing them to polling stations, (c) elections being boycotted by parties who felt that they weren’t free of fair, and (d) the Ikhwan being banned. Had such heavy-handed tactics by the government not taken place and if Ikhwan was eligible to be a legitimate political party, with its over 1 million members, it would undoubtedly dominate any subsequent elections.