[psychoteddybear]

Reacting to his first political crisis, Muse met with his ministers on July 6 to discuss the administration's relations with parliament and its positions toward the reconciliation process, the folding of Puntland's security forces into the T.F.G. and the T.F.G.'s opposition to agreements with foreign companies and states. He promised to set up a constitutional court that had been provided in Puntland's 1998 constitution, a move that observers marked as a means to allow him to override parliament.

Tensions remained high through the second week of July, breaking into the open on July 16, when Hashi revealed that he had been given a copy of a letter from the chief justice of Puntland's High Court, Ahmed Said Abdi, requesting Puntland's attorney general to bring charges against the speaker. On July 17, Abdi resigned, only to retract his resignation on July 19, reportedly after being pressured by the administration to do so.

On July 20, a cabinet committee met with a parliamentary committee appointed by Hashi to discuss legislators' accusations that Muse, Afqura and Abdi were attempting to "silence" the speaker. The ministers apologized to Hashi and promised that Muse would issue an official apology shortly. Garowe Online reported that the attorney general had refused to press charges because he had no case against the speaker.

On July 22, Muse issued a formal apology, in return for which parliament would reinstate his ally, former speaker Osman Dalmar, who had been ousted for misconduct. That move sparked opposition from elders in the Sanaag region who accused Muse of interfering in the region's choice of its representatives. On July 23, Muse fired his security minister, Ahmad Abdi Habade, from the Sool region, who had reportedly urged the attorney general not to bring charges against Hashi. Muse also fired Puntland's auditor general, Ahmed Mohamed Hassan, from the Sanaag region, in order to gain control over his increasingly fractious administration.

On July 25 and 26, dissent burst into the streets, with demonstrations in Garowe against Puntland's hyper-inflation that ended with stones being thrown at the president. On July 28, an autonomous authority was set up in the Sanaag region, which has become a base for politicians who had been marginalized by Muse's shake-ups and policies. On July 29, a Somaliland delegation visited the Puntland-claimed parts of the Sool region for the first time since the 2002 annexation.

Meanwhile, Yusuf and Muse held discussions in Garowe on "political and security issues," with Muse promising that Puntland was ready to help the T.F.G. On August 1, Muse announced an agreement to fold Puntland's security forces into the T.F.G., giving Yusuf what he wanted and, perhaps, gaining external support to prop up his administration. In his speech on the ninth anniversary of Puntland's autonomy, Muse said that there is a "need to deal with people who oppose the administration of Puntland."

Conclusion

Although it is far too early to project the results of Puntland's unprecedented slide toward instability, it is clear that the sub-state's presidentialist system has been weakened and that Muse is on the defensive -- with each move that he makes to consolidate his power, he narrows his machine and alienates more political and social forces that become actual and potential power centers. If that process continues, Puntland will be subject to the same devolutionary cycle that PINR has repeatedly described in its accounts of Somalia's southern regions.

The causes of Puntland's current instability reside primarily in fundamental structural factors and secondarily in Muse's "performance failure." Those factors can be presented in a series of questions.

What is Puntland's juridical and political status in "Somalia"? Does Yusuf have the power to get his way and control Puntland through the T.F.G. and use it as a resource to achieve his broader political aims? How will a weakened Puntland administration cope with the problem of negotiating the tightrope act of defending Puntland's particular interests in the context of broader national reconciliation? Will internal opposition to Muse lead to the fragmentation of Puntland and the appearance of the decentralized politics characteristic of Somalia's southern regions, or will the oppositions coalesce and shift the balance of power between the branches of government relatively peacefully? How emboldened will Somaliland become in the pursuit of its territorial claims? To what degree will the political opposition to the T.F.G., which includes Jama Ali Jama among its prominent figures and is slated to hold its own national conference in September, attempt to intervene in Puntland's politics? Will nonpayment of civil servants, deployment of security forces in the south and hyper-inflation continue; and will interests disaffected by Muse's policies and investment and trade agreements harden their opposition, setting the stage for a popular movement aimed at removing the president, which can be achieved by a two-thirds majority of parliament? Will the T.F.G. and its Ethiopian ally attempt to rescue Muse if his authority collapses?

All of the preceding questions are open and they do not exhaust the relevant possibilities. They show, instead, the complexity of Puntland's political situation at the present moment. As events unfold, it appears that the underlying structural tensions shaping Puntland's politics were subdued by Yusuf and his machine, and that they have now come to the surface because Muse lacks Yusuf's political skills, military resources and power base -- he simply does not have the clout that is necessary to keep a machine functioning and, therefore, he has not been able to make a presidentialist formula work.

Occupying one-third of the territory of the original Somali republic and with one-quarter of its population, Puntland's stability is crucial to the success of broader reconciliation efforts and to stability in the Horn of Africa. If Puntland enters a devolutionary cycle, any national accord will be more difficult to achieve; if major armed conflict breaks out between Puntland and Somaliland, there will be a threat of instability spreading through the Horn of Africa.

None of the possibilities offered here has a precise probability attached to it. What is clear is that Puntland's relative stability can no longer be taken for granted by international political actors and foreign investors. Puntland has come into play.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

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